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Abstract
This paper examines the nature of conflict and conflict resolution over the use of miombo 
woodlands in three study sites in Zimbabwe, namely Nyamayaro, Mafungabusi and 
Romwe. The data was collected mainly through the participatory rural appraisal 
technique, specifically using group discussions and interviews with key informants as the 
research tools. Conflict is generally conceptualised in literature as a discourse of 
negotiating rights and obligations in natural resources. Insights from the three case 
studies indicate that the ethnic friction, contest over boundaries, institutional conflict, 
intergenerational conflict and conflict over token co-management that characterised the 
management and use of miombo woodlands was more than a discourse of negotiating 
rights and obligations. It was a conflict fuelled by people’s struggle to secure access to 
resources that were of core-significance for survival in a rural economy, such as land, 
timber and thatch-grass for construction, pasture and others. The issue of rights did not 
seem to matter to a people who were in dire need for particular resources. In essence, 
what mattered most was gaining access to resources that held a key to rural livelihood. 
Therefore, conflict resolution depended on either adaptive management of miombo 
woodlands to accommodate the survival imperatives in a rural economy or providing 
people with alternative forms of livelihood.
Key Terms: institutional conflict, ethnic friction, intergenerational conflict, contested 
boundaries, co-management problems, rural livelihood, adaptive management.
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IN TR O D U C TIO N
The prevalence of conflict over natural resources is well documented (Anderson et. 
a/..,1996; Ayling & Kelly, 1997; Ortiz, 1999; Sithole & Bradley, 1995; Moyo et. al.., 1992; 
Murombedzi, 1992; Scoones and Cousins, 1991). Scoones and Cousins (ibid) argue that 
resources that are highly valued are also highly contested. However, they find, as does 
other common property resources (CPR ) literature that such competition for resources 
can result in tightly controlled property rights (Bromley and Cemia, 1989). But there is 
lack of consensus in literature about the impacts of such contests, as others suggest that 
conflict result in chaos, which abates natural resources degradation (Murphree, 1991; 
Buckles & Rusnak in Rusnak [Ed] 1999; Little and Brokensha 1986). Social scientists like 
Fortmann (1995), suggest that conflicts are an important aspect of the discourse where 
resources, rights and obligations are negotiated. Similarly, resource economists like 
Becker and Ostrom (1995), suggest that conflict or such contests are part of the ongoing 
negotiations for resources within CPRs. For example, Ostrom proposes that when such 
conflicts occur, users and their officials have rapid access to low cost, local arenas to 
resolve conflict among users or between users and officials (Becker and Ostrom, Ibid). 
Nevertheless, one major weakness with the 'high value-high contest’ and 'conflict as 
discourse’ approach to conceptualising conflict in the use and management of natural 
resources is that they down play the role that the social structure plays in either 
fomenting or averting conflict.
With regards to causes, conflict is perceived as an artefact of human needs denied 
(Burton, 1990), resource competition (Hirsch, et. at. in Buckles [ed] 1999), lack of equity, 
justice and fairness (Kant & Cooke in Buckles [ed]) and governments’ centralised 
“fences-and-fines” approach to conservation policy of the expropriation of lands and the 
forced relocation of communities (Weitzner & Borras in Buckles [ed] 1999). In Zimbabwe, 
conflicts highlighted so far are between communities over resource management 
boundaries for grazing (Cousins, 1989), within communities, over individuals attempting 
to privatise communal resources and among institutions, over the control and 
management of key communal resources (Scoones, 1991). In addition, the case of 
Zimbabwe, where 80%  of the population, mainly blacks, were confined to 20% of the land 
resulted in a communal area shrinking in land size and trees available to a given 
population. This, in turn led to contestations over the scarce resources (see Fortmann, 
Ibid). All the causes sketched above are significant in explaining conflict in natural 
resource use. However, in order to unravel causality with practical implications on conflict 
resolution we need to focus on patterns of interaction at micro-level, that is, between the 
individual and the grassroots institutions involved in a particular resource enclave.
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This paper examines conflict over use of miombo woodlands in three study sites and 
argues that livelihood imperatives at household level are at the centre of conflict in the 
management of miombo woodlands. W e argue further that, unless we understand the 
internal logic of an illegal act, the rewards of non-conformity and the mind-set of a 
desperate man, we are far from diagnosing and resolving conflict in the management of 
woodlands and forest reserves. The paper also spot-lights some attempts at conflict 
resolution from some of the ciase studies to reflect on the extent to which some of 
Ostrom’s design principles for enduring institutions in governing sustainable resources in 
CPR fits actual practice. ,
METHODOLOGY AND STUDY S ITE S
This paper uses three case studies from Zimbabwe, namely, Nyamayaro Village, Romwe 
Catchment Area and Mafungabusi Forest Reserve to explore the nature of conflict over 
woodland resources. A  village in this paper refers to a kraal under a kraalhead. A  VID CO  
refers to administrative boundaries that encompass more than one kraal. A  forest reserve 
is an area designated as a protected area under the Forest Act. All these sites are EU -  
Miombo project sites. The EU-Miombo project is a regional project involving 3 southern 
African countries, Zimbabwe, Malawi and Tanzania. The project covers wide-ranging 
issues such as governance, institutions, socio-economics and others.
Miombo woodlands are a type of vegetation found in seven countries in eastern, central 
and southern Africa, namely Zimbabwe, Angola, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, 
Democratic Republic of Congo and Zambia (Lind & Morrison, 1974; White, 1983). In 
Zimbabwe, miombo woodlands referred to as “musasa or munondo” (Shona names), are 
the most extensive woodland type covering most parts of the central watershed of the 
country. A  number of sub-types are found within this woodland, based on the dominant 
species (see Zimbabwe Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan, 1998). Miombo 
woodlands have diverse uses and are central to the livelihood systems of millions of rural 
and urban dwellers (Campbell et. al., 1996; Lawton, 1982; Dewees, 1993). See Figure 1 
below for a summary of uses of miombo woodlands extracted from Campbell et. al., 
(Ibid).
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The data for this paper was collected using participatory rural appraisal techniques. In 
particular, due to the study's focus on conflicts, data collection relied heavily on key 
interviewee and group discussions. Some interviews were also conducted with officials 
and other representatives of external organisations working in the study areas. Names of 
individuals who were interviewed for the research have been withheld for confidentiality 
purposes. The following section presents research findings from three research sites.
Table 1: Characteristics of the 3 Research Sites
Research Site 
Characteristics
Nyamayaro Village Romwe Catchment 
Area
Mafungabusi 
Forest Reserve
Location Murehwa district, 154 
km east of Harare
Chivi district, 86km 
south of Masvingo 
town
Gokwe South district, 
130 km north west of 
Kwekwe Town
Number of Villages
1 village 3 villages 20 VIDCO Villages
Population 210 250 People 28 000 People
Land Use Category Communal Lands Communal Lands State Forest Reserve
State of Vegetation 
Cover
Most of it cleared for 
crop fields, only 
nearby hills have 
vegetation cover
Sparse in settled 
areas but dense in 
surrounding hills
Dense vegetation 
cover
CASE STUD Y 1 ____________ ________________________________ _________
M a f u n s a b u s i  F o r e s t  Re s e r v e  
B a ck gro u n d
Mafungabusi Forest Reserve is located in Gokwe South district (Zimbabwe) spanning 82 
000 hectares and dominated by miombo tree species. Except for a small part in the 
South East, which shares boundary with small-scale commercial farmers, communal 
lands surround the rest of its boundaries. The forest reserve was gazetted a state forest 
in 1954, retaining people who lived in the area. In the 1960s the status of these people 
was consolidated to tenants. However, due to the outbreak of civil war in the area, in 
1986 people were forcibly removed from the forest reserve by government forces. It was 
feared that their presence in the forest would turn the forest into a 'hive' of insurgents. 
The evicted people were compelled by circumstances to live as squatters in the 
surrounding communal lands. Mafungabusi is the site for an experimental pilot program 
by the Forestry Commission (F C ) in co-management, which served as an instrument of 
“resolving the contested and overlapping rights to forest use” (Matose, 1997:71). The co­
management principles underlying the scheme included the sharing of responsibilities, 
stakeholder participation in decision-making and joint sharing of forest benefits, it 
focused on settlement areas up to three kilometres away from the forest edge (Matose: 
Ibid.). These communities were assumed to he most reliant on forest resources for their 
livelihoods. Resource Management Committees (RMCs) were established in each ward 
as vehicles for the implementation of both community and FC decisions through the 
formulation of plans for harvesting and marketing of various products. The committees 
comprised locally elected people whose mandate was the setting up of harvesting 
patterns and monitoring resource use by villagers, as well as reporting offenders to the
3
Forest Protection Unit (FP U ) of the Forestry Commission (Ramachela, 1996). Eleven 
RMCs were formed around the forest.
Types of Conflicts
Conflicts in Mafungabusi were generally over the state’s gazetting of an originally 
communal land into a forest reserve. The gazetting of the forest did not only displace 
people from their original habitat but also made it difficult for people living on the forest- 
edge to continue to have access to various forest resources.
Ethnic Friction
The Mafungabusi forest-edge communities comprised people of Shona, Shangwe and 
Ndebele ethnic descent. The Shangwe people were traditionally hunter-gatherers and 
considered themselves to be the earliest settlers in Mafungabusi area. They therefore 
perceived the Shona and Ndebele people in the area as migrants. It seems hardly 
contestable that the Shangwe people were the first to occupy the land in and around 
Mafungabusi forest reserve because all the chiefs in the area were of Shangwe descent.
With regards to access to some of the resources in the forest reserve, the RMCs 
predominantly composed of the Shangwe people were responsible for issuing permits to 
people intending to collect thatch-grass in the forest reserve. In principle, RMCs were 
expected to issue the permits to any member of the forest-edge community in need of 
grass without discriminating. Nevertheless, in practice, RMCs tended to favour people of 
Shangwe descent in their issuing of permits. This resulted in some Shona and Ndebele 
people deliberately violating rules and regulations of appropriating resources from the 
forest. As a protest measure, some members the non-Shangwe ethnic group refused to 
co-operate with the institution of RMCs in ensuring sustainable utilisation of forest 
resources. One strategy they adopted to deal with the unfair distribution of permits by 
RMCs was to refuse to co-operate in reporting some members of their ethnic groups who 
'poached' or illegally appropriated resources from the forest reserve. It is important to 
note that although the ethnic friction did not result in open confrontation, it posed a 
serious threat to sustainable management and utilisation of forest resources in 
Mafungabusi, as the Shangwe and non-Shangwe people used and abused forest 
resources respectively, to express their ethnic differences.
Contested Boundaries
When the Forestry Commission gazetted 82 000 hectares of land as a forest reserve in a 
communal land, it automatically and initially rendered that piece of land and its resources 
out of bounds to communities living within and outside the forest reserve. The new 
boundary separating forest edge communities and the forest reserve put resources 
beyond the reach of local communities. Local communities were against this 
development because they perceived the forest reserve area as their original homeland. 
As a result, in Spite of the government gazette, they continued to appropriate resources 
illegally from the forest reserve. In essence, they did not recognise the state-imposed 
boundary of the forest reserve.
Institutional Conflict
Resource Monitoring Committees worked hand in glove with the Forestry Commission’s 
Forest Protection Unit (FP U ) in the management of the Mafungabusi forest reserve and 
ensuring a sustainable utilisation of the resources therein. The former was composed of 
representatives of local communities and kept funds paid by local people to obtain 
thatch-grass from the forest reserve. This did not please the traditional leadership in the 
area. They felt that the collection of funds by RMCs was making them more powerful 
than traditional leaders. Consequently, traditional leaders, especially kraal heads started
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discouraging their people from co-operating with RMCs in the management of the forest 
reserve such as the reporting of some local people who 'poached’ various forest 
resources.
Intergenerational Conflict
The impact of the creation of a forest reserve on land previously under communal tenure 
reflected generation differentials. Generally, the older generation secured cropping land 
outside the forest although with poor soils. Hence, they were not as dependent on the 
forest resources as the young generation. Firstly, the young generation was strongly 
against the creation of a forest reserve because it deprived them of an opportunity to 
'own’ land that they could use for growing crops. The local communities’ recognition of 
the forest as a reserve, in a co-management arrangement with the Forestry Commission, 
put paid the local youths’ hope of securing arable land in the forest. Furthermore, one 
area of concern to the youth with regards to the gazetting of the forest was the denial of 
access to wood for carving purposes. Although most youths in the area were involved in 
woodcarving as a source of income, the Forest Commission denied the youth permission 
to obtain wood for carving from Mafungabusi. Part of the blame for this problem was 
targeted at the older generation who were accused of co-operating with the FC  in the 
enforcement of the no-wood-for-carvings rule because they themselves were not 
involved in woodcarvings.
Co-management Problems
In the co-management scheme forged between the Forest Commission and the local 
communities, RMCs were supposed to serve as structures for implementing both 
community and FC  decisions through the formulation of plans for harvesting and 
marketing of various products. However, RMCs never participated fully in co­
management and resource sharing. Project documents were full of the rhetoric of 
community participation and empowerment but a closer look at what was happening on 
the ground indicated tokenism at play (see Matose, 1997:75). Box 1 sums up the F C ’s 
lack of sincerity in forging a co-management scheme with the forest-edge communities.
Box 1: Brief Profile of the Co-management Scheme in Mafungabusi
• Constitution of the scheme drafted in English by the Forestry Commission and 
Ministry of National Affairs and Employment Creation.
• Draft circulated to forest edge communities for comment
• The  FPU excluded RM Cs from decision-making and policing of the forest
• Local communities denied access to poles, game meat and arable land in the forest.
• Resources to be shared decided by the F C  and limited to non-timber resources such 
as access to grazing land, thatching grass, broom grass, mushrooms, mopane worms 
(a type of edible caterpillars), fruits and firewood.
• Traditional leaders not part of the team leading in the co-management scheme.
• Projects to be undertaken by the community in the forest reserve dictated by the 
Forestry Commission.
• RMCs accountable to the FC.
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It is also important to note that RMCs, which were supposed to be sub-committees of 
VIDCOs, were not even trusted by the FC. For instance, they did not hold joint patrols 
with the FPU. Furthermore, RMCs could not hold meetings alone. There had to be a 
Forest Commission representative at every meeting they held. Whenever RMCs wanted 
to withdraw money from the community project account, the FC  had to counter-sign the 
withdrawal.
Due to lack of sincerity on the part of the FC, forest edge communities refused to co­
operate in the co-management scheme. Local communities shielded forest resource 
poachers from arrest by the Forest Protection Unit. In fact, most local people did not 
perceive the culprits as poachers but hunters.
CASE STUD Y 2
Ro m w e  Ca t c h m e n t  A rea
Background
Romwe Catchment is located near Ngundu business centre in Chivi district, about 86 km 
south of Masvingo town. The catchment area lies in wards 23 and 25 of the southern part 
of Chivi district. Three traditional villages, namely Dhobhani (in ward 25), Zihambe (in 
ward 23) and Tamwa (in ward 23), fall in the Romwe catchment. Of the three villages, 
two are partly contained within the catchment. In 1998 Dhobhani had 40 households, 
Zihambe 33, and Tamwa with 56 households. The Dhobhani and Zihambe people are of 
Ndebele origin while those from Tamwa are of Shona origin.
The area began to be referred to as the Romwe catchment in 1995. Some local people 
say prior to that it was referred to as kumaNdebele (the area of Ndebele people) because 
the original immigrants from Shurugwi who were settled in the area were Ndebele 
speaking (Nemarundwe et. aA, 1998). The Shona people in the area argue that they were 
the original inhabitants of the area. According to them, the area belonged to the 
Nemavuzhe clan, who were Shona speakers of the ngara totem. Around 1950, these 
people were evicted from the area when it was designated grazing land by the colonial 
government. In 1952 the displaced people were surprised when they saw the Ndebele 
people settling in the land from which they had been evicted. On realising that their land 
was being taken over by foreigners, most Shona people flocked back but others could 
not come back to be subjects of the Ndebele who had established leadership structures 
in the area.
Rainfall in the area is low and erratic, ranging from 450mm to 600mm per annum. Crop 
failures and livestock losses result from the drought lead to greater pressures on the 
woodland resources (Nemarundwe et. ai, 1998).
Types of Conflict
The Romwe catchment study identified major conflicts centred on the conversion of 
grazing areas into settlement and arable land (from communal to private ownership). This 
resulted in restricted access to areas where community members previously had access 
to woodland resources such as firewood, fruits, poles, thatching grass and pasture for 
livestock.
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Ethnic Friction
The set up in Romwe was that only two villages, Dhobhani and Zihambe were in the 
catchment area and predominantly constituted of Ndebele speaking people. Of all the 
neighbouring villages, Tamwa is closest to the catchment area. Although all villages 
composed of Shona speaking people are located outside the catchment area, the Shona 
people 'poached’ resources from the catchment area. They argued that when the 
Ndebele people settled in the area that originally belonged to the Shona, they violated 
the Shona people’s norms and values pertaining to resource conservation and 
sacredness of certain places in the catchment area. Therefore, the Shona people 
perceived their 'poaching’ of resources in the catchment area as an expression of their 
general disgruntlement with the Ndebele people’s lack of sense of conservation for 
resources in the area. Ironically, the Ndebele perceived the Shona people’s illegal 
appropriation of resources in the catchment area as indicative of a people who had no 
respect for natural resources in general. Owing to this scenario, the Ndebele people felt 
they did not have an incentive to conserve since the Shona would illegally appropriate 
whatever they conserved.
Contested Boundaries
The conflict over boundaries in Romwe was at two levels, namely, inter-village and intra­
village. Inter-village conflict took the form of neighbouring villages, that is Tamwa and 
others outside the catchment area, refusing to recognise the catchment area boundaries 
that put resources in the catchment woodlands out of bounds to them. People from 
neighbouring villages claimed that the catchment area was originally theirs before 
eviction and subsequent occupation of the land by migrants-the Ndebele speaking 
people. In fact, people from neighbouring villages felt that they had more rights to the 
resources in the catchment area than the Ndebele speaking people of Dhobhani and 
Sihambe.
Intra-village conflict was mainly over the conversion of grazing land into arable and 
settlement land. Most of the woodlands in the catchment area were being cleared for 
farming. Some local people who either had inadequate or lacked arable land could not 
recognise the demarcation of land into arable and grazing area. They desperately wanted 
arable and settlement land regardless of the boundary.
Institutional Conflict
Traditional authorities, namely, the kraalhead, headmen and chief were effective in 
resources management during the 1950s and 1960s. Local people reported that at that 
time, cases of norm and rule breaking were very limited because traditional leaders’ 
commanded respect among their people and worked closely with extension officers and 
district administrators.
However, with the attainment of independence in 1980, the new government instituted 
elected village development committees (VIDCOs) and ward development committees 
(W ADCOs). As in other parts of the country, these institutions had a mandate to monitor 
resource use in Romwe. Nevertheless, reality on the ground indicated that VIDCOs were 
abating the conversion of grazing land into arable and settlement land. The Communal 
Land Act of 1982 conferred VIDCOs with the authority to allocate land in their areas of 
jurisdiction. In pre-independent Zimbabwe, this function fell in the office of traditional 
leaders, namely, the Chief, Headmen or Kraalhead. Consequently, despite the traditional 
leaders’ objection to the change of land use from grazing to arable and settlement land, 
the VIDCOs proceeded to allocate some local people land for farming in areas originally 
designated as grazing land. The conversion of grazing land info arable land resulted in
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the destruction of woodlands, depriving most local people of both pasture and woodland 
resources such as wood for carving, timber, thatch-grass and others.
Intergenerational Conflict
In Romwe, the conflict over woodland resources also assumed an intergenerational 
dimension in that it was mostly the young generation who converted grazing land into 
arable land. The young generation argued that the older generation could afford to 
respect the delineation of land into arable and grazing land because most of them 
already had land for cultivation. Moreover, it was the older generation which needed 
grazing land most because most of them owned livestock. A  majority of the young 
generation did not have livestock. Hence, to the young generation the setting aside of 
land for grazing purposes was a waste of arable land. On many occasions, elders who 
openly protested the conversion of grazing land into arable land were threatened with 
being beaten up by the youths concerned.
Co-management Problems
Romwe did not have a state-community partnership in the management of its woodlands, 
which could be studied under the co-management scheme. Nevertheless, one may note 
in passing that under a management arrangement one might refer to as 'state-assisted 
natural resource conservation’ (SNRC), the state neglected its role. Ideally, in an SN RC 
arrangement, the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) has a mandate to promote 
natural resources conservation in all communal lands. This also involved punishing 
people violating conservation laws. In the case of Romwe, the DNR officers who were 
responsible for monitoring natural resource use and conservation in the area did not 
make any effort to stop the conversion of grazing land into arable and settlement land. 
The kraal-heads who were compelled to watch by while woodlands were being 
destroyed, expressed concern over the DNR officers’ failure to take action. The kraal- 
heads observed that it was as if the officers condoned the action.
C A S E  S T U D Y  3
NyAMAYARO Village 
Background
This traditional village is found in Nhehweyembwa ward (Murehwa district) and is located 
between two mountain ranges to the east of Chivake River Bridge. It is about 500m north 
of the Harare-Murehwa highway and about 7km west of Murehwa Growth Point. It is a 
small village with only 35 households of Shona speaking people.
The people of Nyamayaro originally migrated from a village called Chiweshe, after 
Nyamayaro, then an ordinary villager, had a misunderstanding with the incumbent village 
head. He and other disgruntled villagers decided to leave Chiweshe. The six households 
sought the permission of the District Commissioner and the reigning Chief Mangwende to 
settle in the area, latter named Nyamayaro, after the new kraal-head. The conditions for 
starting a new settlement such as surveying of land and pegging of contour ridges were 
met before people settled in the area. Neighbouring villages claimed that the Nyamayaro 
village was sited on land that was originally designated as grazing land, hence people 
from neighbouring villagers referred to them as vanhu vekumafum [those who live in the 
grazing lands].
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At the time these people settled on what is now Nyamayaro kraal, the area had thick 
forests, replete with wild fruits. Firewood was abundant since there were many dry trees 
in the area. There was no need for anybody to cut down live trees for firewood. Arable 
and grazing land was in abundance too. However, the increase in population was not met 
by a concomitant increase in the woodland, arable and grazing lands. This resulted in an 
alarming level of deforestation that threatened his people with shortages of woodland 
resources such as firewood, timber and others. The only woodlands that remained were 
in two hills that formed the northern and southern border of the village. The situation 
compelled the kraal-head, Nyamayaro, to seek measures of stemming further 
degradation. He therefore initiated a woodlands conservation program by consulting his 
people to decide on rules and regulations that needed to be put in place to ensure a 
sustainable utilisation of the woodland resgurces. At the time, neighbouring villages had 
had all their woodlands degraded due to uncontrolled wanton appropriation of woodland 
resources.
Types of Conflict
Ethnic Friction
Some cases of ethnic friction noted in Romwe and Mafungabusi were non-existent in 
Nyamayaro because most members of the community were of Shona ethnic descent. 
However, at the time of fieldwork a migrant from Mozambique joined the community.
Contested Boundaries
As in Romwe, conflict over boundaries in Nyamayaro had also an inter-and intra-village 
dimension. Inter-village conflict resulted from people from neighbouring villages, 
especially Chiweshe, to the north, who ‘poached’ woodland resources such as firewood, 
poles, carving-wood and others from Nyamayaro. The culprits usually justified their acts 
by pointing out that Nyamayaro village was established in what was originally their 
grazing area. In fact, that was the reason the boundary of Nyamayaro village was not 
recognised by most people from neighbouring villages. The following case captures the 
boundary wrangle that existed between the people of Nyamayaro and Chiweshe villages:
Most people in Nyamayaro village conformed to the new rules and regulations of 
obtaining resources from the woodlands. One of the rules was that, if a member of the 
community needed firewood, he or she approached the kraal-head, who would 
accompany the community member to the woodlands and select a tree which one could 
cut down for firewood. Although the rules and regulations were beginning to be effective 
tools in the management of the woodlands in Nyamayaro, people from Chiweshe 
continued to ’poach’ the resources. This undermined the Nyamayaro people’s motivation 
to conserve their woodlands.
Consequently, kraal-head Nyamayaro arranged for a meeting with kraalhead Chiweshe 
seeking his assistance in discouraging the illegal appropriation of woodland resources by 
his people. The following case material summarises what transpired at the meeting:
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When Nyamayaro arrived at Chiweshe’s homestead, the two leaders exchanged friendly greetings 
and updated each other on a number of general issues. However, the atmosphere turned tense 
when Nyamayaro introduced the issue of degradation of woodland resources in his village by 
some of Chiweshe’s people. At that point, Mr. Nyamayaro advised his visitor to change the subject 
if at all the good personal relationship existing between them was to be maintained. However, 
Nyamayaro insisted on discussing the matter since that was the main purpose of his visit. From 
thereon, the host became annoyed and told his guest that he needed to be reminded of two 
issues.
The first issue was that Nyamayaro people were squatters on land originally set aside as grazing 
area for the Chiweshe people. The  fact that the Chiweshe people allowed Nyamayaro people to 
settle and cultivate crops in their grazing area did not mean that they had totally surrendered their 
right to the resources on the land. It was only out of the spirit of good neighbourliness that they did 
not go on an all-out war to drive the Nyamayaro people out of the area.
The second issue was that woodland resources were not only for people living next to the 
resources. Anybody, from any village had a right to fetch fire-wood and any other resources one 
needed from any other village. The practice was only illegal when one obtained the resources 
from a farm without the permission of the farm owner. Furthermore, Nyamayaro was asked 
whether he had ever complained about people from the city (Harare) who often came into the area 
to collect fire-wood and wild fruits for sale in town. “Saka imi vokwaNyamayaro mava kuda 
kuzviona savana Matenganyika' ? Zvatinoziva ndezvokuti ruzevha nderwe munhu wose!* 
Chiweshe said.
Nyamayaro maintained his calm in the face of the outbursts. He did not respond to any of the 
remarks until Chiweshe asked, “What do you want from me?"
“Stop your people,” Nyyamayaro said.
Chiweshe responded, “I can only stop people I have sent. How then can I stop people I haven't 
sent?”
Box 2. Kraal-heads’ Meeting
Institutional Conflict
The existence of dual structures of authority in Nyamayaro village, namely, the kraal- 
head and V ID CO  resulted in institutional conflict. The kraal-head's authority over the 
village was rendered ineffective by the introduction of the VIDCO. This institution 
assumed jurisdiction over natural resource management and other issues, which 
previously were the responsibility of the kraal-head.
Nevertheless, when the VID CO  took over control of Nyamayaro village, most local people 
started behaving as if they were an authority on their own. During this period, many 
woodland resources in the village such as fire-wood, poles, wild fruits and others were 
lost. The VID CO  did not make an effort to stop the abuse of resources because they 
were afraid of losing political support. When the kraal-head expressed his concern over 
the degradation of the resources, V ID CO  officials and their supporters threatened to beat 
him up and reminded him of the fact that he was not an authority in the village anymore. 
They would only consult him on any matters requiring spiritual leadership (ritual 
ceremonies).
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What happened in this village when the VID CO  assumed authority was a disaster. I have 
never seen anything like it in my life. It was a case of people coming together to elect a group 
of children to run the village. Some of the children-elected to lead the village had just finished 
their Form Four ( '6 ’ Level). The elections made them masters over their mothers and fathers. 
I’m not just talking about my own shock but imagine your 18-year-old son becoming a 
member of the VID CO  to be in charge of the affairs of a village you live in. If you are the father 
and you commit an offence, how would you feel being summoned for trial before this 
committee of children?
Although it is not proper for me to say ail of them were children1, their behaviour in general 
was that of children. They did not seem to be serious about anything. All they cared about 
was to be liked by many people the bad and the good. But how can you be a good leader 
when even men of evil deeds regard you as a best friend?
People were doing whatever they wanted in this village. The VID CO  would turn a blind eye to 
the destruction and theft of forest products. The  Committee told me that I could not have a say 
in what was going on in the village because I was not elected in the VIDCO. Therefore, I had 
no choice but to watch idly as the woodlands were being destroyed.
Box 3. Tale of the Kraal-head (Nyamayaro)
Intergenerational Conflict
In Nyamayaro village, conflict in the management of miombo woodlands also indicated 
the existence of intergenerational conflict. It was the young generation that was mostly 
accused of cutting down trees for poles to build houses. However, the young men argued 
that it was unfair for anyone to prohibit them from cutting down trees because almost all 
new homesteads in the village were built of pole-and-dagga. Brick houses featured later 
as one became more settled in life.
Co-management Problems
Nyamayaro woodlands did not fall under a state-community co-management scheme but 
in the SNRC system. Therefore, the issue of co-management was not investigated. 
However, as in the case of Romwe, the SN RC system never worked in Nyamayaro. The 
Department of Natural Resources had officers at Murehwa centre but they never visited 
Nyamayaro village to assist in the community-based woodlands management program. 
The officials blamed it on lack of transport, whereas their offices were just 4 km away 
from Nyamayaro village. Their failure to assist the community’s conservation efforts 
annoyed the Nyamayaro people. The community strongly felt that they would have not 
lost their woodland resources to neighbours if the officials were doing their job.
CONFLICT R ESO LUTIO N : SLE.4NIN&S FROM TH E  CASE STUD IES
This section focuses on some insights on conflict resolution in the management of 
miombo woodlands gained from the three case studies presented above. From the 
outset, it seems necessary to point out that not ail forms of conflict and case material 
mentioned in this paper offered clues on conflict resolution.
Ethnic Harmony
Ethnic friction over access to woodland and forest resources, noted in Romwe and 
Mafungabusi respectively, was never resolved to ensure a sustainable management of
the resources. Instead, the friction persisted with each ethnic group positioning itself to 
optimise its benefits from the illegal appropriation of woodland and forest resources.
Recognition of Boundaries
In the case of Romwe and Nyamayaro, the issue of contested boundaries remained 
unresolved. The continued poaching of woodland resources in Nyamayaro village by 
outsiders and the conversion of grazing land into arable land by some people of Romwe 
was indicative of lack of recognition of existing boundaries. However, in Mafungabusi, the 
once strongly contested forest reserve boundary started gaining the respect of most 
forest-edge communities after increased community participation in the management and 
utilisation of forest resources.
The first phase of the co-management scheme institutionalised the alienation of forest- 
edge communities from accessing forest resources. The Forestry Commission (FC ) 
aimed at merely incorporating the community in the enforcement of the state’s forest 
conservation rules and regulations, applying in the area designated as a reserve. This 
was done through the setting up of RMCs that were more accountable to the FC  than to 
the communities they represented. At that point, local communities, through their RMCs 
were assisting in the management of the forest without deriving any benefits from it, as 
had been promised at the launch of the co-management scheme. It was therefore difficult 
for them to co-operate in the management of the forest, let alone to respect the forest 
reserve boundary. They continued to appropriate resources from the forest illegally. 
However, when the FC  started delivering on the tariff of benefits promised, most forest- 
edge communities started developing a keen interest in ensuring that people who 
crossed the forest reserve boundary to steal resources were arrested and punished.
Institutional Integration
The degradation of woodland resources in Romwe’s grazing land was abated by the 
power struggle between kraal-heads and VIDCOs. The VIDCOs chose to express their 
authority over the kraal-heads by sanctioning the conversion of grazing lands into arable 
and settlement land. By the time fieldwork for this paper came to an end, the two 
structures of authority had not yet coalesced into a united front for the sustainable 
management of the woodland resources in the area. In the case of Mafungabusi, conflict 
between the Forestry Commission and local traditional leaders over the appropriation of 
forestry resources tapered off when a co-management scheme was forged between the 
FC and the local community. More importantly, the co-operation between the state (FC ) 
and forest-edge communities, in the management of the forest reserve was predicated 
on the state’s acceptance of the communities’ right to appropriate certain resources from 
the forest in a manner that did not compromise sustainable utilisation. In Nyamayaro, a 
more organised and sustainable utilisation of woodlands began to be realised when the 
VIDCO and the kraal-head subsumed their authority in a new structure of control-the 
village assembly5. The VIDCO and the kraal-head no longer jostled for recognition as the 
authority in the village. Instead, they came together to lead the village assembly.
Bridging Intergenerational Differences
The intergenerational conflict in Nyamayaro was mainly over access to poles for building 
purposes. The young generation needed shelter. In order to ensure that the youth had 
access to shelter without decimating existing indigenous woodlands, the village started a 
eucalyptus plantation. Although small, the plantation catered for most of the local youths’
5 The term 'village assembly’ is used here loosely to refer to an informal administrative structure in 
which all members of the village participated in deciding the affairs of the village led by the kraal- 
head and the VIDCO.
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demand for timber. Meanwhile, in Romwe catchment area, the intergenerational conflict 
persisted without a solution in sight. The youths continued to convert grazing lands 
(woodlands) into arable and settlement areas because they were in dire need for land. In 
Mafungabusi, the youths continued to pose a problem in the management of forest 
resources because the elder generation and the FC  had completely denied them an 
opportunity for woodcarving, which was the predominant economic activity among the 
young generation in the area.
Involvement vs. Incorporation
The conflict of interest between the state and forest-edge communities in the 
management of Mafungabusi forest was expected to end with the forging of a co­
management scheme. Nevertheless, in its early stages, the FC-proposed co­
management scheme was manipulative in character. It did not recognise forest-edge 
communities as stakeholders in the conservation of the forest. In essence, the FC  was 
failing to live up to the terms and conditions of the co-management constitution that it had 
formulated and imposed on forest-edge communities to authenticate. In practice, local 
communities objected to be part of this deal and continued to illegally appropriate 
resources from the forest. The co-management scheme only started securing community 
co-operation when the FC  showed a commitment to fulfil its promises of 'active 
involvement by the local communities’ in return for specified benefits. From thereon, 
RMCs began to enjoy the support of most of the forest-edge communities.
SOME IN S IG H TS  FROM TH E  CASE S TU D IES
One school of thought views conflict in natural resource management as a form of 
discourse where rights and obligations in common property resources are negotiated 
(Fortmann, 1995; Becker & Ostrom, 1995). Another view, to the contrary, argues that 
conflict results in chaos, which in turn leads to the degradation of natural resources 
(Buckles & Rusnak in Rusnak [Ed] 1999; Murphree, 1991; Little and Brokensha 1986). 
Data from the three case studies referred to above indicate that conflict is both a 
discourse of clarifying rights and obligations to CPR and of licensing wanton degradation 
of resources, especially where intervention by a more authoritative agent is not secured 
in time to avert the chaos. Perhaps, more importantly, the data seems to indicate that 
conflict over access to miombo woodlands has a more fundamental dimension, that of 
defending livelihoods. It is more than a discourse of negotiating rights and obligations, 
but the pedagogy of securing one of the essentials of rural livelihoods.
The ethnic friction in Romwe and Mafungabusi over access to woodland and forestry 
resources, respectively, brought into sharp focus the issue of entitlement on the basis of 
a common language and migration history. Both the Shona of Romwe and the Shangwe 
of Mafungabusi referred to migration history to legitimate their actions and claims of right 
to resources. They claimed to be “pioneer settlers” (Sithole, 1999:214) to the lands with 
the contested resources. Ethnic groups that came after them were the migrants (see 
Sithole, 1999, for different types of migrants). Essentially, in each of the cases, a 
common language and history defined ethnic identity, more than descent. In the case of 
Mafungabusi, the RMCs that were predominantly composed of Shangwe speaking 
people used the 'pioneer-settlers’ argument as a basis for claiming and defending the 
Shangwe people’s 'entitlement’ to most of the forest resources. This behaviour supports 
Blau’s (1967) observation that groups whose interests are served by existing 
organisations defend them against attack and fortify them. The tendency to use the 
ethnic divide to defend a group’s interests or access to scarce resources against out-
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groups6 is a common phenomenon in Zimbabwe. In 1999, a Member of Parliament for 
Chiredzi South was arrested after he mobilised 50 Shangani men and attacked Karangas 
(a minority, migrant ethnic group in the area) in Jeka village. The Shangani men had 
been at loggerheads with the Karangas over a tract of land along the Runde river in Chief 
Chilonga’s area where they wanted to forcibly remove the Karanga people (The Herald, 5 
April, 2001:1) from a predominantly and originally Shangani territory. Becker and Ostrom 
(1995:119) posit that the existence of “rapid access to low cost, local arenas to resolve 
conflict among users or between users and officials” is a prerequisite for sustainable 
governance of resource use. In the case of Romwe and Mafungabusi, there were no 
institutions put in place to resolve conflict among users of forest and woodland resources. 
The institutions, which once existed to deal speedily with a ll forms of conflict, that is 
kraal-heads and chiefs, were dis-empowered by the post independence government and 
replaced by VIDCOs ad W ADCOs. Unfortunately, the latter were institutions essentially 
meant to spearhead development in their respective areas rather than deal with conflicts 
perse. ; . .  ■ \ •' ' .  '
The issue of boundaries has attracted a lot of attention in CPR  literature (see Becker & 
Ostrom, 1995; Ostrom 1997; Shackelton et. a l, 1998; Sfthole, 1999; Scoones, 1989; 
Lewis 1991; Mandondo, 1998; Sithole & Bradley, 1995). One camp perceives boundaries 
as a panacea for conflict in the management of common property resource (see Becker 
& Ostrom, 1995; Ostrom 1997; Shackelton et. al., 1998). The views of these scholars 
cluster around Becker & Ostrom’s (Ibid: 119) design principle or theory that sustainable 
CPR have clearly defined boundaries. Oh the other hand, there are scholars who are 
sceptical about the efficacy of thiis theory in explaining conflict and its resolution in CPR 
management (Lewis, 1991; Nhira & Fortmann, 1993; Rocheleau, 1992; Mandondo, 1998, 
Sithole, 1999; Scoones, 1998). The latter perceive boundaries as negotiable (Rocheleau, 
1992), defined by interaction or social networks (Lewis, 1991), blurred by multiple 
layering of rights over a resource (Nhira & Fortmann, 1993) and, as soft and porous to 
allow use of resources by other people living in villages far from the resource. Mutepfa et. 
al. (1998) contend that “as long as communal resources are both formally state and 
informally customary lands, authority and management will be compromised, and open 
access tendencies will thrive,” despite the existence of boundaries.
The case studies of Romwe and Nyamayaro indicated that despite the existence of 
clearly marked boundaries between villages, people still ignored boundaries that were 
meant to put resources beyond their reach (see also Sithole and Bradley, 1995 for 
conflict over boundaries of dambos in Mutoko and Chiduku [Zimbabwe]). With regard to 
Becker and Ostrom’s (1995) principle of 'clearly defined boundaries’, the three case 
studies seem to point at the need for drawing physical boundaries of a resource, taking 
into account the multiple layers of socio-economic interests that cut across the use of a 
particular resource. In other words, it is not enough for common property resources to 
have clearly marked boundaries. The physical boundaries should reflect a consensus 
view of all interested parties or stakeholders. Nevertheless, the prevalence of 
Contestations over boundaries in the management of CPR  seems to warrant further 
studies on the social dynamics of boundaries. Such studies may be instrumental in 
influencing physical planners to approach the marking of boundaries as an exercise in 
social engineering7.
The degradation of woodland and forest resources in Romwe, Nydmayaro and 
Mafungabusi was abated by institutional conflicts. Conflicts between and among
6 The term out-group is used here loosely to refer to other ethnic groups to which one does not 
belong.
7 Social engineering refers to a deliberate process of influencing social interaction between and 
among people to be controlled by the boundary.
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institutions over the management of natural resources have drawn the attention of many 
researchers (see Gore et al., 1992; Sithole & Bradley, 1995; Murphree, 1993; Becker & 
Ostrom, 1995; Sithole, 1999; Mamimine in Nherera e t al. [ed], 1999; Murombedzi, 1990). 
In the case of Romwe and Nyamayaro, the conflict between VIDCOs and traditional 
leaders, that is kraal-heads, has a jurisdictional antecedent. Gore et al.. (1992) observe 
that “In situ lineage leadership8institutions had, for many years, taken responsibility for 
resource allocation and use. These traditional institutions provided for rights of avail and 
defined and enforced rules and regulations that controlled resource use.” They argue 
further that the relegation of the traditional structures to non-functional roles after 
independence has led to a breakdown of some of the time-tested environmental 
conservation approaches, e.g. selective tree cutting and others. Instead of operating as 
government conduits for the sustainable management of natural resources VIDCOs in 
Nyamayaro and Romwe have tended to operate as stumbling blocks in that regard (see 
also Sithole, 1999:135; Mamimine, in: Nherera e t al. [ed] 1999:153). Murombedzi (1990) 
sees the conflict between traditional leaders and VID CO s as a fight over the control or 
authority over land.
In Mafungabusi, institutional conflict over the management of forest resources pitted the 
Forest Protection Unit against traditional leaders. Traditional leaders refused to co­
operate with RMCs, which were perceived as another , extension of the Forestry 
Commission. The leaders felt that RMCs were becoming more powerful than them, with 
regards to the management of forest resources. Moreover, RMCs were more answerable 
to the FC  in the conduct of their work than to the traditional leaders. In fact, they 
functioned as “extensions of central government, accountable to the centre rather than to 
the community” (Murombedzi, 1992).
Institutional conflict in Romwe, Nyamayaro and Mafungabusi point to the dangers of 
placing institutions in a hierarchical relationship or what Sithole, (1999), calls 'parallel 
systems of adjudication’. The traditional or lineage institutions were relegated to a 
position of least significance in the management of woodland and forest resources. 
Ironically, a 'modem’ institution, that is the VIDCO, elevated to the highest position in the 
management of natural resources at the local level, through a legal mandate, proved to 
be highly dysfunctional, and worse still, facilitated the degradation of woodland and forest 
resources. Although RMCs, (also a modem institution) did not work against the 
conservation of forest resources, their closeness to the F C  rather than to the local people 
and its leadership, rendered the co-management or resource sharing scheme suspect. 
Therefore, it seems reasonable to argue that a sound institutional framework for the 
management of natural resources should be characterised by change and continuity. In 
essence, traditional institutions should be integrated or be accorded a role in the 
management of the resources. This is not to suggest that the traditional institutions 
should have their past roles in natural resource management reinstated fully, but to blend 
best practises from the past (represented by traditional leadership), with what is 
envisaged to be the strengths of 'modem’ institution.
Each generation of resource users may have interests and needs that are different from 
that of earlier generations.-The need for arable land (Romwe and Mafungabusi), timber 
for building purposes (Nyamayaro) and wood for carving (Mafungabusi), pitted the young 
generation against local elders who did not require these resources. The situation 
rendered any efforts by adults to restrict the youth’s access to such resources irrational 
thereby generating conflict. Strum cited in Western e t  a/..,[ed] (1994) notes that when 
interests diverge, often most dramatically between generations, the means of arbitration 
may no longer function. Seemingly, in order to accommodate the interests of the young
8 Refers to kraal-heads, headmen and chiefs.
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generation without compromising sustainable utilisation of the resources, there is need to 
shift to adaptive management9 of resources.
The Mafungabusi forest’s co-management project between local communities and 
Forestry Commission, fall under the relational management system. Characteristically, 
conservation projects of this nature seek to obtain the co-operation of protected-area 
neighbours by making such areas a source of economic and developmental benefit to 
surrounding communities (see Murphree in Western & Wright, [Eds.] 1994). It is worth 
noting that in this type of projects, the issue of benefits, (of whatever form) as incentives 
for community co-operation in natural resource management, is of cardinal importance to 
the attainment of conservation goals. This is in keeping with the argument that, 
“communities view conservation as a means rather than an end” (Murphree cited in 
Western & Wright, [ed] 1994:404). The term co-management implies that the 
Mafungabusi forest-edge communities were participating fully in resource management 
and sharing. Nevertheless, in reality, both local communities and RMCs meant to 
represent them never participated fully in the co-management scheme. Project 
documents were full of the rhetoric of community participation and empowerment but a 
closer look at was happening on the ground, indicated tokenism at play (see Matose, 
1997:75).
It is difficult for one to comprehend how the scheme could be termed 'co-management’, 
when in actual fact the FPU excluded RMCs from decision-making and policing of the 
forest. The claim of resource-sharing was just a facade since local communities were 
denied access to poles, game meat and arable land in the forest, which were prime 
resources to them. The resources to be shared were decided by the FC  and limited to 
non-timber resources such as access to grazing land, thatching grass, broom grass, 
mushrooms, mopane worms (a type of edible caterpillars), fruits and firewood. 
Unfortunately, the above concession did not succeed in eliminating conflict between state 
agents (FC ) and local communities since the most contentious resources are those that 
are most valuable for local production (see Scoones & Cousins, 1994). In this case, it 
was the land. Why then did the state agent (FC ) exclude land from the tariff of benefits to 
derive to communities from the co-management and resource-sharing project?
Arnstein (1969)’s “ladder of participation” adopted by Matose (1997:75-76) in forest 
management identifies, inter alia, two levels of community participation in order of 
importance. The first one is where local people manage their own resources, that is, 
taking over forests controlled by outsiders such as the FC. The second one is in form of a 
partnership, equivalent to effective joint forest management or resource sharing. But the 
latter has a major weakness of the probability of being reduced to mere consultation. 
Such was the situation obtaining in Mafungabusi, clearly negating the basic principle of 
popular participation in forest management. The highest degree of co-management 
involves equal partnerships in decision-making (Moyo, 1995). Hence, in situations where 
the state fails to accord communities a meaningful say in the management and sharing of 
forest resources, such as in Mafungabusi, the whole edifice’ of co-management of forest 
resources turns out to be a spurious partnership. Habermas foresaw an increasingly 
powerful bureaucratic state undermining the possibility of local people participating 
usefully in decision-making processes via the usual democratic institutions (Craib, 1984: 
211).
Under the sophistry of 'co-management’, the state invites local communities to take part 
in their own systematic dispossession. This occurs under the guise of what Scoones et. 
a/., (1994:586) call the state legitimation ideology of “conservation and protection”. In
9 Adaptive management refers to the adoption of a management style that caters for the interests 
of all stakeholders without compromising the goal of sustainable utilisation.
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order to stem the conflict between local communities and forest resources in 
Mafungabusi a more participatory approach should be adopted (Bradley & McNamara, 
1993), with communities becoming guardians and managers of resources (Matose, 
1997).
The failure by state agents to assist or punish offenders of conservation rules and 
regulations in Romwe and Nyamayaro was also a clear indication of state’s lack of 
commitment to work with communities in ensuring sound utilisation and management of 
miombo woodlands. For instance, villagers surrounding Nyamayaro continued to poach 
woodland resources from Nyamayaro village without courting punishment from the 
Department of Forestry or Natural Resources Department officers. The state did not also 
do anything to ensure that the people of Romwe respected land designated as grazing 
land.
CONCLUSION
Unless we understand the internal logic of an illegal act, the rewards of non-conformity 
and the mind-set of a desperate man, we are far from diagnosing and resolving conflict in 
the management of woodlands and forest reserves. Without the provision of alternative 
forms of livelihood in rural areas, people are compelled by circumstances to interact with 
woodlands and forests in a manner that may be construed as fundamental irrationality by 
a people who are naive to believe that rural people lack a survival instinct. The case 
studies discussed above indicate that people violated woodland and forest management 
regulations in order to secure resources that were core to their rural livelihoods. There is 
nothing wrong with setting aside land for grazing purposes but there is something 
fundamentally wrong with it, when people without livestock are forced to respect the 
zoning when they have nowhere to cultivate. State forest reserves are a commendable 
conservation scheme but not when gazetted next to a people who are critically short of 
arable land. As long as conservationists continue to regard some rural people’s genuine 
demand for arable land and essential forest resources as mere stumbling blocks to 
conservation efforts, attempts at sustainable utilisation and management of miombo 
woodlands would remain elusive and a flash-point of conflict among stakeholders.
Conflict and conflict resolution in the management of miombo woodlands is a complex 
issue that requires the tackling of socio-economic fundamentals. With regards to this, 
shortage of land looms large both as the barrier to sound management of woodlands and 
forests and a causal factor to the conflict. A  people who are short of arable land in an 
agro-based economy and other natural resources critical to their survival, cannot be 
convinced that setting aside some pieces of land exclusively for the conservation of trees 
or for grazing purposes is a sensible and viable land use option. To  them lack of access 
to adequate arable land means lack of a reliable source of food. Saraph cited in Oneka 
(1996) observes that “when the only tool you have is a hammer everything begins to look 
like a nail”. This statement summarises the place of land in conflict over natural resource 
management such as woodland and forest resources. Therefore, conflict resolution in the 
management of miombo woodlands would succeed if the illegal appropriation of 
resources were approached as a symptom of a broader problem of lack of access to 
arable land and woodland products of critical importance to rural livelihoods. Once the 
distribution of these key resources is responsive to the needs of rural livelihoods, 
communities and individuals are likely to be more supportive of conservation efforts from 
both within and without the communities, thereby minimising conflict in the management 
of miombo woodlands.
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